The Role of Law in Reducing Barriers to Citizens Participation in
Community-Based Natural Resource Management Models
by Becky L. JACOBS, Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College
of Law (United States).[1]
Environmental
protection and natural resource management are highly complicated, dynamic
processes intersecting natural and social systems. Policies related to these
issues involve a broad array of inputs, including, among others, scientific
data, legal information, value judgments, philosophical perspectives, and
economic decisions, and they can have momentous consequences not only at
international, national, and state levels, but also for communities and
individuals. In recognition of these impacts, policy and lawmakers in 50+
countries are pursuing community-based approaches to environmental protection
and natural resource management by delegating some
degree of management and decision-making authority over parks or other
protected areas; forests; water, coastal resources, and fisheries; wildlife;
and other natural resources to community user groups.[2]
One framework
for promoting citizen participation in the management of public natural
resources is the Community-Based Natural Resource Management Model (CBNRM).
This model adopts a socio-ecological approach that integrates local
institutions, customary practices, and community knowledge structures into
natural adaptive systems protection and administration. It is believed that
consideration of these factors and that involvement of local stakeholders in
management, regulatory, and enforcement processes will result in improved
resource management outcomes.[3]
This paper
will briefly describe the CBNRM model and will review its use in relation to
various levels and categories of legal obligations in two very different
contexts. It also will consider barriers that have been identified to citizen
participation in these CBNRM models and will explore how law or other
instruments might be utilized to respond to these challenges.[4]
Community-Based
Natural Resource Management is a very flexible management approach. Under the
model, the state retains primary ownership of the land or other resource, and
it also retains some form of management authority.[5] Local communities in CBNRM projects
assume legal obligations and obtain rights or privileges to use and benefit
from environmental or natural resources in a defined area.[6] By
incentivizing stakeholder populations to sustainably manage the relevant
resource and by leveraging that population’s local expertise about natural and
social conditions, the CBNRM approach seeks to improve environmental and
socioeconomic outcomes.[7]
CBNRM programs
are designed and implemented in their own cultural contexts, and they can take
multiple forms. There are, however, several elements that frequently appear to
be present in successful programs. For example, researchers agree that most
effective collaborative schemes have clearly defined communities of users and
resource systems.[8]
These elements ensures that those who bear the cost of the program receive its
benefits. Relatedly, in successful CBNRM ventures, external governmental
entities recognize the rights or interests of community users in the resource,[9]
and community rules require an equitable alignment of user costs and benefits.[10]
Monitoring,
proportional sanctions, and low-cost dispute resolution are other features
commonly found in the rules of productive CBNRM programs, as are rules: (1)
that have been developed by or in collaboration with the community, (2) that
are based upon local conditions, and (3) that are flexible and incorporate
procedures for future modifications.[11] Sufficient external support, whether financial or
administrative, governmental or non-governmental,
is another important factor. [12]
Not all
prosperous CBNRM programs will be based upon these design elements, and,
concomitantly, failing projects may feature many of these components. However,
a combination of these organizational characteristics appears to typify robust
institutions for managing common-pool resources.[13]
CBRNM sites
are located throughout the world, and the model’s principles have been applied
across a broad range of natural resources and communities. The following two
examples demonstrate its flexibility and its potential for improving the
quality and effectiveness of citizen participation in environmental and natural
resource management.
The Republic
of Namibia is a sparsely populated country situated along the south Atlantic
coast of Africa.[14]
It is a member of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the international convention designed to
ensure that international trade does not threaten the sustainability of listed
wild animals and plant species.[15]
After gaining
its independence in the early 1990’s, the new Namibian government was
confronted with the monumental task of promoting social development and
economic growth while preserving the nation’s rapidly disappearing wildlife
resources. Because hunting prohibitions had been inadequately enforced,
impoverished Namibians reportedly had hunted wildlife illegally on communal
lands and cooperated with commercial poachers.[16]
These conditions resulted in the decimation of a number of species in the
country, including black rhinos, elephants, zebras, and lions; one source
estimates that wildlife populations in northern Namibia may have been reduced
by up to 90%.[17]
Consistent
with its obligations under CITES and its goals to promote both sustainable
economic and wildlife resource development, the Namibian government enacted the
Nature Conservation Amendment Act of 1996 (1996 Act) authorizing any group of
people residing on communal land to apply for conservancy status.[18] Legal
conservancies must have a defined membership with a representative management
committee, a defined border, and a legally-enforceable constitution that
provides for a wildlife management strategy and an equitable distribution of
benefits.[19] The Ministry of Environment and
Tourism (MET) has the discretion to recognize a conservancy, subject to any
conditions, and to withdraw or amend that recognition at any time. Recognized
conservancies have the right to hunt, capture, cull, and sell “huntable” game
and may apply to the MET for permits to use protected game quotas for trophy
hunting.[20]
As of 2014, there were 82 registered conservancies, impacting
approximately 177,435 people and covering an estimated 20% of Namibia’s land
mass.[21]
There are similar community associations operating in a Namibian national park
and in over 30 community forests.[22]
Advocates of Nambia’s conservancy programs proudly note that the 1996 Act’s
legislative framework “devolves 100% of the benefits from the sustainable use
of wildlife to resident communities … and recognizes the conservancy as the
legitimate manager and beneficiary of both consumptive and non-consumptive
commercial forms of wildlife use.”[23] These benefits purportedly advance
sustainability goals by improving the competitiveness of wildlife vis-à-vis
agriculture as a land-use and by creating legal incentives for communities to
conserve wildlife.[24]
Conservancy monitoring systems report that poaching has decreased;[25]
Namibian elephant populations increased from approximately 5,000 to 16,000 from
1984 to 2008,[26] and
other wildlife species have experienced similarly impressive population
increases.[27] The
recovery of conservancy wildlife stocks has stimulated private sector
investment in the conservancies in the form of trophy hunting and wildlife
harvesting as well as tourism lodges and camps, often the result of joint
ventures between investors and conservancies.[28]
Citizen
participation in the conservancies produce benefits for users beyond the
economic and environmental. Members develop administrative, dispute resolution,
management, and leadership competencies; expand their social networks; and
generally enhance social capital.[29]
Namibian conservancies are responding to gender equity issues: women
purportedly are active participants on conservancy committees and in management
positions in registered conservancies. Conservancies are leveraging their
financial, physical, and human resources for rural development activities such
as local education, water supply, and public health. While some have noted
program shortcomings,[30]
most agree that Namibia’s conservancy program is a successful example of CBNRM.
The New
England coast of the U.S. is home to the Atlantic cod fishery, once one of the
most productive fishing grounds for this fish in the world.[31]
Stocks collapsed in the 1990’s due to overfishing, and they are still
dangerously in decline.[32] Commercial and recreational fishing
interests, politicians and regulators, the environmental community, and the
general public all have a stake in this fishery and have opinions about how
best to respond to the crisis.
All US
fisheries are subject to overlapping layers of legal authority. At the national
level,[33]
the 1976 Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson Act)[34]
and its reauthorizing legislation, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation
and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act), also referred to as the MSA or the
Sustainable Fisheries Act, establish exclusive federal authority over fisheries
from three miles to two hundred miles offshore.[35]
The Magnuson Act was promulgated initially to respond to foreign fishing by
promoting the development of a domestic fleet and to involve local fishing
communities in the management process; the reauthorized Magnuson-Stevens Act
also incorporates conservation goals for all US fisheries, including stock
recovery provisions such as annual catch limits, accountability measures, and
possible essential fish habitat (EFH) designations.[36]
The National
Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA Fisheries) shares federal responsibility for
fisheries with eight regional councils,[37] including the New England Fishery Management
Council (NEFMC). NEFMC has management authority over the Atlantic cod fishery
and is required by the Magnuson-Stevens Act to formulate a Fishery Management
Plan (FMP) for relevant stock. Its Northeast
Multispecies (Groundfish) FMP establishes management measures for thirteen
groundfish species, including the Atlantic cod.[38]
Early plans failed to reverse the cod crisis.
In 2003, in an
effort to experiment with alternative conservation models, the NEFMC advanced
one proposal, Amendment 13,[39]
to the Northeast Multispecies FMP. This
proposal, among other things, created a CBNRM-like trial program that
allowed fishermen to organize and manage their own “sectors.” Sectors received
a prescribed allocation of the fishery’s quota based upon their fishing history,
a fundamental shift of approach from a management regime based primarily upon
input controls such as area closures, vessel and gear restrictions, and limits
on “days at seas.”[40] The trial was deemed a success, and,
in 2010, the sector approach was expanded and formalized in Amendment 16.[41]
Each approved
sector develops a binding Operations Plan and a Sector Contract with compliance
plans for quotas and conservation measures. NOAA Fisheries must approve the
Operations Plan, and all sector members must execute the Sector Contract.[42]
If a sector complies with its quota, its future annual catch limit will not be
reduced even if the general fishery exceeds its target fishing allocation.[43]
Sector members may trade or lease their stock allocations through their sector
managers.[44] Catch and other compliance measures
are monitored.[45]
Despite the
tremendous shift in operating culture that it represents, the region’s fishing
community appears to be adapting to the sector approach. NOAA Fisheries reports
that sectors catch nearly 98% of the groundfish harvest.[46]
Within the sector system, members have much more flexibility to manage their
fishing. For example, they are not limited to days at sea or number of trips,
and they can freely trade quota.[47]
They also can decide when to fish, allowing them to time the market better, and
sectors have begun to directly contract with large retailers. Boat size is no
longer as much of a factor, and sectors members are consolidating vessels and
saving fuel. Economically, data for the 2010 fishing season indicate that,
while gross revenues for groundfish in the fishery were down $1.8 million
compared 2009, total revenues increased $26.6 million.[48]
Additionally, while reductions in catch limits certainly are a primary
factory, sectors appear to be assimilating the conservation goals of the
program. It is reported that no sector exceeded its quota in the first year of
the sector program.[49]
Because sector fish are no longer common pool resources, sector members have a
conservation incentive to, for example, invest in gear that reduces habitat
destruction and improves sustainability.[50]
Additionally, where before there was a strong history of antagonism between
fishing communities and scientists, academics, conservationists, and
non-profits, sector members have been incentivized due to severe financial
constraints to collaborate with these groups to transition administrative and
operating practices and to monitor compliance and stock levels.[51] These collaborations have built
stronger, more resilient trust relationships, and the industry now has a more
active role in the collection and evaluation of data used for regulatory
purposes.
Yet it appears
that NOAA Fisheries may have implemented its innovations too late in the
Atlantic cod fishery’s decline to make a real difference in species recovery.
Despite gains in domestic fish stock sustainability overall, the acting US
Secretary of Commerce declared a commercial fishery failure for the Northeast
Multispecies (Groundfish) Fishery for the 2013 fishing season, and, in that
year, cod catch and price decreases contributed to a 66.2% decline in revenue.[52]
In 2014, NOAA Fisheries scientists reported that New England cod stock dropped to all-time record low levels, with a population
at only 3-4% of sustainable yield.[53] Overfishing
is not the only cause of this decline; pollution, construction activities, and
the rapid warming of waters of the New England coast all have been identified
as factors in the collapse.[54]
Fishery stakeholders are
confronting monumental challenges, but, from a CBNRM programmatic perspective,
sector “community user groups” in the US Atlantic cod fishery advocating for
management approaches that continue to weaken or decrease stocks clearly are
failing to improve resource management outcomes, a primary objective of the
CBNRM framework.
CBNRM has the
potential to increase citizen participation in environmental and natural
resource management, strengthening the democratic process. However, as the two
examples discussed above demonstrate, there are unique challenges to involving
citizens in programs that govern highly technical, multidimensional ecological
systems. Further, each CBNRM project confronts a distinct set of concerns based
upon idiosyncratic historical and sociocultural contexts.[55]
The contextual distinctions between the Namibian wildlife and the US
Atlantic cod fishery CBNRM examples are evident. While both programs manage
“mobile or fugitive resources … [that require] coordination across multiple
administrative units,”[56]
the profiles of the user communities and their management challenges are vastly
different.
Many Namibian
conservancies, for example, encompass one or more distinct traditional
communities. Traditional authorities in these communities still exercise
extensive authority, and community members adhere to customary roles.
Accordingly, while data report that women are well represented among
conservancy staffs, these staff jobs are typically aligned with
culturally-ascribed gender activities such as cleaning and cooking.[57]
CBNRM programs may encourage women and other marginalized community members to
enroll in conservancies, but, without addressing existing
power hierarchies, these members are likely to feel disempowered.[58]
More generally, low literacy rates are a significant barrier to conservancy
participation, either economically or managerially.
This compromises the “defined community of users” design factor that
appears to be an important feature of successful CBNRM programs, as well as
several other of those characteristics.
If the Namibian government privileges traditional male leaders, women
and other marginalized individuals may decide that their costs to participate
in the program are greater than any benefit they may derive and will withdraw
their support for, or contributions to, the program.
Law can mandate transparency, accountability, and non-discrimination,
but it will not immediately reverse historical community socio-cultural norms
and traditions. Properly designed, however, legal interventions may have the
power: (1) to authorize or expand access to education and skills/technical
training; (2) to provide financing for economic and social capital development
to marginalized conservancy members as a path to influence in conservancy
management; and (3) to legislate minimum committee membership allocations,
voting requirements, and flexible work scheduling.
Contrast the
Namibian conservancy experiences with that of the sectors in the Northeastern
US fishery. Sector members primarily are literate business owners or employees
with verifiable experience in the Atlantic cod fishery. Because all members are
jointly liable for compliance with the sector’s annual catch limit, most
sectors formed along social or cultural lines and are geographically based;
sectors may be further identified by gear type or by affiliation with an
industry group.[59]
While these citizens have operated largely independently in the fishery, and
they may have found it more difficult to transition to collaborative
management,[60]
they have strong social networks. Network norms and other elements of social
capital likely facilitated their participation in the sector program.[61]
Yet the cod
population is still crashing in the NEFCM region. While there are multiple
factors affecting cod stocks, many of the characteristics present in successful
CBNRM programs also appear to be lacking in the NEFMC sector program,
potentially with negative impacts on program outcomes. For example, many
contend that the defined community in the sector system excludes a number of
important users, including important recreational interests, and that it
allocates benefits unevenly.[62]
Further, the costs of participation in the program may be disproportional to
the benefits for many users. Finally, in this instance, the government appears
to have all but ceded management control to sector interests, potentially
sacrificing long-term stock recovery for short-term economic motivations.
Even had all
of the design features of a successful CBNRM program been present, however, a
legally enforceable model may, regrettably, have been proposed and implemented
at a point in the US Atlantic fishery when the cod population may be beyond
recovery.
The CBNRM
model has the potential to increase citizen participation in decisions that
impact natural systems. Natural resource and environmental management choices
encompass a wide range of considerations, including natural, social, political
sciences, economics, cultural and other contextual influences, and they must be
made in the presence of risk and uncertainty. The first-hand ecological
knowledge of local resource users can be an invaluable component of decisions
about resource administration, and it can illuminate existing scientific data
and guide future research efforts.[63]
However, in
order for their participation to be meaningful, individuals must have, or must
develop, the skills to engage in an effective, empowered, and timely way. While
not a panacea, law can play a critical role in promoting the conditions in
which citizens can acquire such skills and authority. Further, law can
structure and adapt public participation to accommodate a CBNRM program’s
cultural context, political and economic environment, resource type, or
ecological setting.
In addition to
encouraging citizen participation in environmental protection and natural
resource decision-making, laws promoting CBNRM should also be crafted so as to
achieve the framework’s other primary objective, to improve resource management
outcomes. Those who have the authority and capacity to participate must be
accountable for its exercise; the law must improve accountability and
transparency, at all levels of governance.
[1] Contact:
jacobs@utk.edu
[2] Derek Armitage, Adaptive
Capacity and Community-Based Natural Resource Management, 35 Envtl.
Mgmt. 703, 403 (2005), available
at
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00267-004-0076-z/fulltext.html.
[3] Id.
[4] This paper
supports and complements the thesis set forth in the article submitted by Wendy
E. Wagner for this symposium, The
Missing Link in Citizen Participation in U.S. Administrative Process. In
her article, Professor Wagner argues that there is “a disconnect between the
procedural means of ensuring participation and the end goal of engaging
affected groups in US administrative process.” (Emphasis omitted). The CBNRM is
a one alternative for engaging affected groups in both the administrative and
the management processes.
[5] Ctr. for Int'l Envtl. Law et al., Whose
Resources? Whose Common Good? Towards a New Paradigm of Environmental Justice
and the National Interest in Indonesia 2, 9-10, 14 (Jan. 2002), available at http://
www.ciel.org/Publications/Whose_Resources_3-27-02.pdf.
[6] Whose Resources?, supra note 5, at 2.
[7] See, e.g., Elizabeth
Burleson & Diana Pei Wu, Non-State
Actor Access and Influence in International Legal and Policy Negotiations,
21 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 193,
201-03 (2010).
[8] Michael Cox, Gwen Arnold &
Sergio Villamayor Tomás, A Review of
Design Principles for Community-based Natural Resource Management, 15 Ecology
& Soc’y 38 (2010).
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Stefan
Carpenter, The Devolution of
Conservation: Why CITES Must Embrace Community-Based Resource Management, 2
Ariz. J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 1,
17 (2011). See also infra § 3. When external governmental support is viewed
as control or imposition, however, it can disincentivize the target
communities. See Thomas G. Measham
& Jared Lumbasi, Success Factors for Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM):
Lessons from Kenya and Australia, 52 Envtl. Mgmt. 1, 2 (2013). Further, user communities are also
subject to leadership failures and negative political dynamics. See id.
These and other issues have subjected CBNRM principles to critical scrutiny. See, e.g., Stephen Turner, A
Crisis in CBNRM? Affirming the Commons in Southern Africa, 10th IASCP
Conference, Oaxaca, Mexico, available at:
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00001501/00/Turner_Crisis_040508_Paper361.pdf. Even critical commentators opine, however, that the model’s philosophy is sound and that
CBNRM programs should perform well under the right circumstances. Measham &
Lumbasi, supra.
[13] See Elinor
Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
30 (1990).
[14] Overview, Government of Namibia,
http://www.gov.na/about-namibia.
[15] What is Cites?,
Cites: The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.php. There currently are
181 State Parties to CITES; Namibia became a Party in 1990. See List
of Contracting Parties, https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/parties/chronolo.php.
[16] Carpenter, supra note 12, at 16.
[17] Id. (citations omitted).
[18] Nature
Conservation Amendment Act (1996).
[19] Id. at § 3. See also Karol Boudreaux, A
New Call of the Wild: Community-Based Natural Resource Management in
Namibia, 20 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev.
297, 304-05 (2008).
[20] Carpenter, supra note 12, at 24-25.
[21] Summary of Conservancies,
http://www.nacso.org.na/SOC_profiles/conservancysummary.php.
This figure is likely underreported as it represents data from only 79 of the
82 conservancies. Id.
[22] Elephants
Don’t Like Coke or Fanta, What’s New,
Namibian Association of CBNRM Support Organisations,
http://www.nacso.org.na/index.php.
[23] L. Chris Weaver, Elly Hamunyela, Richard
Diggle, Greenwell Matongo & Theunis Pietersen, The Catalytic Role and
Contributions of Sustainable Wildlife Use to the Namibia CBNRM Programme, CITES and CBNRM - Proceedings of an
International Symposium on “The Relevance of CBNRM to the
Conservation and Sustainable Use of CITES-Listed Species in Exporting Countries”
59, 61 (ICUN Max Abensperg-Traun, Dilys Roe & Colman O’Criodain eds. 2011)
(CITES and CBNRM). This author
takes no position in the debate regarding sustainable extractive uses of
wildlife. Many have fundamental ethical objections to hunting or to any other
extractive practices that they designate as exploitative. Proponents contend
that these objections are related more to “western cultural sensitivities
surrounding the welfare of charismatic animals” than to conservation values. Id.
at 137.
[24] Id. at 61.
[25] Id. at 61 n.3.
[26] Carpenter, supra note 12, at 28.
[27] Id.
[28] Id. at 27. Investors and commercial
hunting operators often include conservation and social empowerment clauses in
their contracts with the conservancies that incentivize long-term maintenance
of wildlife populations and critical habitats. See CITES
and CBNRM, supra note 23,
at 63.
[29] Id.
[30] For example,
Article 21(g) of the Namibian Constitution guarantees citizens the right to
“move freely throughout Namibia[,]” preventing the exclusion of non-members
from conservancy lands. NAMIB. CONST. art. 21(g). There also are uncertainties
pertaining to customary land rights within conservancies. See
Boudreaux, supra note 19, at 322-24.
[31] Georges Bank, Atlantic, Places in the Sea,
https://marine-conservation.org/media/shining_sea/place_atlantic_georges.htm.
[32] André Verani,
Community-Based Management of Atlantic
Cod by the Georges Bank Hook Sector: Is It a Model Fishery?, 20 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 359, 361-65 (2007).
[33] While beyond
the scope of this short article, international law also has played a role in
the allocation of fishery resources in Georges Bank. See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area
(U.S. v. Can.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12).
[34] 16 U.S.C. §§
1801-1882 (1988).
[35] 16 U.S.C. §§
1801-1891 (2012). The reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Act is currently
being considered in the U.S. Congress. H.R. 1335 – 114th Congress: Strengthening Fishing Communities
and Increasing Flexibility in Fisheries Management Act,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr1335.
[36] See Verani, supra note 32, at 366-67. See
generally Peter Shelley, Taking
Stock: The Magnuson-Stevens Act Revisited: Have the Managers Finally Gotten it
Right?: Federal Groundfish Management in New England, 17 Roger Wms.
L. Rev. 21, 30, (2012).
[37] NOAA
Fisheries is a division of NOAA, the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, an agency of the Department of
Commerce. See Verani, supra note 32, at 365.
[38] New England
Fishery Mgmt. Council, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Northeast Multispecies
Fishery Management Plan,
http://s3.amazonaws.com/nefmc.org/MultiSpecies-FMP.pdf.
[39] Amendment 13,
New England Fishery Mgmt. Council, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan,
http://s3.amazonaws.com/nefmc.org/Final-Amendment-13-SEISVol.-I-II.pdf.
The Conservation Law Foundation
and other organizations successfully filed suit against NOAA Fisheries
challenging Amendment 13 on conservation-related grounds. See Conservation Law Found.
v. Evans, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2001). A discussion of the
challenges to Amendment 13 exceeds the scope of this article.
[40] See Roger Fleming et al., Twenty-Eight
Years and Counting: Can the Magnuson-Stevens Act Deliver on Its Conservation
Promise?, 28 Vt. L. Rev. 579,
602 (2004).
[41] Amendment 16,
New England Fishery Mgmt. Council, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan,
http://s3.amazonaws.com/nefmc.org/091016_Final_Amendment_16.pdf.
Amendment 16 was also challenged in court. Oceana, Inc. v. Locke, 831 F.
Supp. 2d 95, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2011). See
also Shelley, supra note 36.
[42] See, e.g., 50
C.F.R. § 648.87.
[43] Fleming et
al., supra note 40, at 618.
[44] Jonathan M.
Labaree, Sector Management in New England’s Groundfish Fishery: Dramatic Change
Spurs Innovation, Gulf of
Maine Research Institute 2012,
http://www.gmri.org/sites/default/files/resource/sector_management_in_new_england.pdf.
[45] Compliance is
monitored with reports from seafood dealers, with dockside and at-sea monitors,
and by fish trades amongst sectors Id.
Vessels also are required to maintain an operational Vessel Monitoring System. See, e.g., 50
C.F.R. § 648.85(a)(3)(i); § 648.10.
[46] 75 Fed. Reg.
at 18,114.
[47] Labaree, supra note 44,
at 6.
[48] See Shelley, supra note 36, at 57.
[49] Shannon
Carroll, Sector Allocation: A Misguided
Solution, 17 Ocean & Coastal L.J.
163, 188 (2011).
[50] Id. at 12. Labaree, supra note 44,
at 6.
[51] See, e.g., Rachel
Gallant Feeney, Kenneth J. La Valley & Madeleine Hall-Arber, Assessing Stakeholder Perspectives on the
Impacts of a Decade of Collaborative Fisheries Research in the Gulf of Maine
and Georges Bank, Marine &
Coastal Fisheries: Dynamics, Mgmt. & Ecosystem Science 2, 205–216
(2010).
[52] Harold F. Upton, Cong. Research Serv., RL34209, Commercial Fishery Disaster Assistance (2013),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34209.pdf; 2013 Final Report on the
Performance of the Northeast Multispecies (Groundfish) Fishery [May 2013 –
April 2014] 22 (2nd Ed. Sept. 2015) (2013 Final Report), Northeast Fisheries Science Center Reference
Document 15-02,
http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/publications/crd/crd1502/crd1502-2nd-edition.pdf.
[53] Statement by John Bullard, Regional Administrator, Greater Atlantic
Region, On Gulf of Maine and Haddock Interim and Emergency Actions, NOAA
Fisheries (Nov. 10, 2014),
http://bloximages.chicago2.vip.townnews.com/gloucestertimes.com/content/tncms/assets/v3/editorial/6/ad/6ad9a8ae-691a-11e4-ab67-6b894b7a21e6/5461249c40e50.pdf.pdf.
Despite these dire data, regulators actually proposed reducing at-sea
monitoring requirements in the
Northeast Fisheries Observer Program in 2016. See Prop. NOAA Northeast Multispecies
(Groundfish) FMP Framework Adjustment 55, 50 C.F.R. § 648, 81 Fed. Reg.
15003, 15015-19, 15025-26, 15032-15033 (Mar. 21, 2016),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-03-21/pdf/2016-06186.pdf.
The proposal would drop monitoring levels from 24% of
trips to 14% at a time when the cod fishery appears to be nearing collapse,
ostensibly to relieve the financial burden on groundfish fishermen.
[54] See Shelley, supra note 36, at 70-72. See
also Andrew J. Pershing, et al., Slow
Adaptation in the Face of Rapid Warming Leads to Collapse of the Gulf of Maine
Cod Fishery, 350 Science 809
(2015).
[55] Julia Olson
& Patricia Pinto Da Silva, Changing
Boundaries and Institutions in Environmental Governance: Perspectives on Sector
Management of the Northeast U.S. Groundfish Fishery, 13 Maritime Studies
1, 4 (2014).
[56] Elizabeth
Burleson & Diana Pei Wu, supra
note 7, at 202.
[57] Pempelani Mufune, Community Based Natural Resource Management
(CBNRM) and Sustainable Development in Namibia, 3 J.
Land & Rural Stud. 121, 132 (2015).
[58] Id. at 133.
[59] Labaree, supra note 44.
[60] Laura Taylor
Singer, The Development of Catch Shares:
Lessons Learned from New England, Gulf of Maine Research Institute 2011,
http://www.gmri.org/sites/default/files/resource/the_development_of_catch_shares.pdf.
[61] James Acheson &
Roy Gardner, Fishing Failure and Success
in the Gulf of Maine: Lobster and Groundfish Management, 13 Maritime Studies 8 (2014).
[62] Emily Yehle, Senators Want Recreational Interests
Included in Updated Law, Fisheries,
E&E News PM (Apr. 25, 2016),
http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/stories/1060036215.
[63] See generally Feeney et al., supra note 51.